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Abstract 
 
    Converting a conventional contract into an electronic equivalent is not trivial. The 
difficulties are caused by the ambiguities that the original human-oriented text is 
likely to contain. In order to detect and remove these ambiguities the contract needs 
to be described in a mathematically precise notation before the description can be 
subjected to rigorous analysis. 
    This paper identifies and discusses a list of correctness requirements that a typical 
executable business contract should satisfy. Next the paper shows how relevant parts 
of standard conventional contracts can be described by means of Finite State 
Machines (FSMs). Such a description can then be subjected to model checking. The 
paper demonstrates this using Promela language and the Spin validator. 
 
 
    Keywords: Contract, electronic contract, finite state machine, contract 
representation, contract enforcement, model-checking, validation, correctness 
requirements, safety and liveness properties. 
 
1    Introduction 
     
    A conventional contract is a paper document written in English or other natural 
language that stipulates that two or more signatory parties agree to observe the clauses 
stipulated in the document. An executable contract (x-contract) is the electronic 
version of a conventional contract that can be enacted by a contract management 
system to enforce what the English text contract stipulates. The purpose of both 
conventional and electronic contracts is the same: enforcement of the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties. However, there is a crucial difference between 
the two kinds of contract. A conventional contract is human oriented. Thus, it is likely 
to contain ambiguities in the text that are detected and interpreted by humans when 
the contract is performed; whereas an x-contract is computer oriented; consequently, 
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it tolerates no inconsistencies. According to our findings, contract inconsistencies can 
be categorized into two groups. (i) Internal enterprise policies that conflict with 
contract clauses. (ii) Inconsistencies in the clauses of the contract. In our view, and to 
gain in simplicity, these two issues can be treated separately. In this paper we address 
the second issue. 
    We have observed that inconsistencies in the clauses of conventional contracts are 
normal rather than exceptional, for this reason the logical consistency of a 
conventional contract should be proven by some means before implementing it as an 
executable contract. 
    The question that we attempt to answer in this paper is what are the correctness 
requirements that a typical contract should satisfy and how can they be validated? The 
paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the differences between our 
approach to validating contracts and related research work. In Section 3, we provide a 
list of what we consider the most common correctness requirements for business 
contracts and classify them into conventional safety and liveness properties. In 
Section 4 we briefly discuss our contract model which is based on finite state 
machines. In Section 5 we illustrate with examples how Spin can be used for 
validating correctness requirements. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 6. 
2   Related work 
 
    Validation of correctness requirements of business contracts has been identified as 
a crucial issue by several researchers. In this section we will summarise the essential 
ideas behind three works that we consider to be close to the research work of this 
paper.  
    In the work of Milosevic et. al. [1] [2] a contract is informally defined as a set of 
policy statements that specify constraints in terms of permissions, prohibitions and 
obligations for roles involved in the contract. A role (precisely, a role player) is an 
entity (for example a human being, machine, program, etc.) that can perform an action. 
Formally, each policy statement is specified in deontic logic constraints [3].Thus each 
deontic constraint precisely defines the permissions, prohibitions, obligations, actions, 
and temporal and non-temporal conditions that a role needs to fulfil to satisfy an 
expected behaviour. 
    For example, a constraint can formally specify that, “Bob is obliged to deliver a 
box of chocolates to Alice’s desk every weekday except on Wednesdays for three 
years, between 9 and 9:15 am, commencing on the 1st of Jan 2004”. The 
expressiveness of deontic notation allows the contract designer to verify temporal and 
deontic inconsistencies in the contract. The authors of this approach argue that it is 
possible to build verification software to visually show that, Bob obligations do not 
overlap or conflict. Such verification mechanisms would easily detect a conflicting 
situation where Bob has to deliver a box of chocolates to Alice’s desk and to Claire’s 
who works miles away from Alice’s desk. Similarly, the verifier would detect that 
Bob is not obliged and prohibited to deliver chocolates to Alice during the same 
period of time.    
    Another research work of relevance to ours is the EDEE system. EDEE provides a 
framework for representing, storing and enforcing business contracts [4]. In EDEE a 
contract is informally conceived as a set of provisions. In legal parlance, a provision is 
an arrangement in a legal document, thus in EDEE a provision specifies an obligation, 
prohibition, privilege or power (rights). An example of a provision is “Alice is 
obliged to pay Bob 20 cents before 1st Jan 2004”. Central to EDEE is the concept of 
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occurrence. An occurrence is a time-delimited relationship between entities.  It can be 
regarded as a participant-occurrence-role triple that contain the name of the 
participants of the occurrence, the name of the occurrence and the name of the roles 
involved in the occurrence.  An example of an occurrence that involves Alice (the 
payer) and Bob (the payee) is “Alice is paying Bob 20 cents on 31st Dec 2003.”  The 
formal specification of a contract in EDEE is obtained by translating the set of 
informal provisions derived from the clauses of the contract into a set of formal 
occurrences. Another basic concept in EDEE is query. A query is a request for items 
satisfying certain criteria (for example, “Payments performed by Alice before 31st Dec 
2003”). At implementation level, the occurrences representing the contract provisions 
are stored together with queries and new occurrences in an occurrence store in SQL 
views. 
Business operations invoked by the contractual parties are seen as occurrences 
intercepted and passed through the occurrence store where they are analysed to see if 
they satisfy the contractual occurrences associated with the operations. EDEE has 
been provided with some means for detecting contract inconsistencies. To detect 
overlap between queries (a set of occurrences being both prohibited and permitted, a 
set of occurrences being obliged and prohibited, etc.) the authors of EDEE rely on a 
locally implemented coverage-checking algorithms. 
Of relevance to our research is also the Ponder language [5]. Ponder is a declarative 
language that permits the specification of policies for managing a distributed system 
or contractual service level agreements between business partners. Ponder specifies 
policies in terms of obligations, permissions and prohibitions and provides means for 
defining roles and relationships. To detect and prevent policy conflicts such as 
conflict for a given resource or overlapping of duties, Ponder’s notation permits the 
specification of semantic constraints that limit the applicability of a given policy in 
accordance with person playing the role, time, or state of the system.  
    A common pattern of the related works discussed above is that all of them rely on 
elaborate logical notations that include temporal constraints and role players in their 
parameters. The expectation is that this notation should be able to specify arbitrarily 
complex business contracts and detect all kind of inconsistencies. This generality is 
certainly desirable; however, because of the complexity of the problem it might be 
rather ambitious. We believe that a modular approach is more realistic for detecting 
contract ambiguities. For that to be possible, we need to be able to identify and isolate 
the different sources of possible inconsistencies in business contracts. 
    In our business model [6] enterprises that engage in contractual relationships are 
autonomous and wish to remain autonomous after signing a contract. Thus a signing 
enterprise has its own resources and local policies. In our view each contracting 
enterprise is a black box where private business processes represented as finite state 
machines, workflows or similar automaton, run. A private business process interacts 
with its external environment through the contract from time to time to influence the 
course of the shared business process. Thus, a contract is a mechanism that is 
conceptually located in the middle of the interacting enterprises to intercept all the 
contractual operations that the parties try to perform. Intercepted operations are 
accepted or rejected in accordance with the contract clauses and role players’ 
authentication.  
    From this perspective, we can identify two fairly independent sources of contract 
inconsistencies:  
• Internal enterprise policies conflicting with contractual clauses. 
• Inconsistencies in the clauses of the contract. 
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    It is our view that these two issues should be treated separately rather than 
encumbering a contract model with excessive notation (details, concepts and 
information) that might be extremely difficult to validate. Such a separation is not 
considered in the work discussed above. In this paper we address only the second 
issue, that is, we are concerned only with the cooperative behaviour of business 
enterprises and not their internal structure. 
    Our approach is to represent business interactions as finite state machines. Use of 
finite state machines for representing such interactions has been proposed for Web 
services (Web service conversation language, WSCL [7]). We note that inter-
organisation business interactions, PIPs (partner interaction processes) as specified in 
Rosettanet industrial consortium [8] can also be represented as finite state machines. 
    In our business model each contracting enterprise has the privilege and 
responsibility of verifying that its internal policies do not conflict with the clauses of 
the contract. Similarly, each enterprise exercises its independence to choose the roles 
players that would invoke operations on the contract and provide them with a proper 
contract role player certificate (a cryptographic key for example). Consequently, it is 
the responsibility of each enterprise to prevent inconsistencies with role players such 
as duty overlapping, duty separation, etc.   
    In our contract model we intentionally leave the notion of role players out of the 
game. However, we assume they are authenticated by the contract management 
system before they are allowed to perform operations of the FSMs. It can be argued 
that our FSM model lacks expressiveness in comparison with the related works 
discussed above. However we do gain in simplicity. Thanks to this simplicity we can 
use standard of-the-shelf model checkers like Spin [9] to validate general safety and 
liveness properties of contracts, relatively easily.   
3 Common correctness requirements  
 
    Knowing the correctness requirements of an x-contract at design time is crucial as 
an x-contract can be proven correct only with respect to a specific list of correctness 
requirements. The parts of a contract that more likely contain logical inconsistencies 
vary from contract to contract. On the other hand, it is sensible to think, that different 
contract users would be interested in being assured of the correctness of different 
parts of a given contract. Because of this, it is too ambitious to intend to identify a 
complete list of correctness requirements for business contracts. However, it is 
possible to provide a list of fairly standard correctness requirements and to generalise 
them. Hopefully, this generalisation will help designers of x-contracts reason about 
correctness requirements of x-contracts in terms of conventional and well understood 
terminology such as correct termination, deadlocks, etc. In the following list CR 
stands for correctness requirement:    
     CR1: Correct commencement: An x-contract should start its execution in a well-
defined initial state on a specific date or when something happens. This correctness 
requirement is a special case and cannot be guaranteed by the x-contract itself but by 
the human being or system (software or hardware) that triggers the execution of the x-
contract.  
    CR2: Correct termination: An x-contract should reach a well-defined termination 
state on a specific date or when something happens. For example, the x-contract 
terminates on the 31st of Dec 2005 or the x-contract terminates when the purchaser 
delivers 500 cars. 
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    CR3: Reachability: Each and every state within an x-contract should be reachable, 
i.e. executable at least in one of the execution paths of the x-contract.  
    CR4: Freedom from deadlocks: An x-contract should never enter a situation in 
which no further progress is possible. For example, an x-contract should not make a 
supplier wait for a payment before sending an item to the purchaser while the 
purchaser is waiting for the item before sending the payment to the supplier. 
    CR5: Partial correctness: If an x-contract begins its execution with a precondition 
true then, the x-contract will never terminate (normally or abnormally) with the 
precondition false, regardless of the path followed by the x-contract from the initial to 
its final state. For example, if the amount of money borrowed by a customer from a 
bank is Debt= 0 at the beginning of the x-contract, the x-contract cannot be closed 
unless Debt=0.  
    CR6: Invariant: If an x-contract begins its execution with a precondition true then, 
the precondition should remain true for the whole duration of the contract. A slight 
variation of this correctness requirement would be a requirement that the precondition 
remains true only or at least during certain parts of the execution of the x-contract. To 
mention an example we can think that an x-contract between a banker and a customer 
stipulates that the amount of money borrowed by the customer should never exceed 
the customer’s credit limit. 
    CR7:  Occurrence or accessibility: A given activity should be performed by an x-
contract at least once no matter what execution path the x-contract performs. A slight 
variation of this requirement is one that demands that a certain activity should be 
performed infinitely often. For example, an x-contract between a bank and a customer 
should guarantee that the customer will receive bank statements at least once a month.  
    CR8: Precedence: An x-contract can perform a certain activity only if a given 
condition is satisfied. For example, the lend period of a book in the possession of a 
student should not be extended unless the waiting list for the book is empty. 
    CR9: Absence of livelocks: The execution of an x-contract should not loop 
infinitely through a sequence of steps that has been identified as undesirable, 
presumably because the sequence produces undesirable output or no output at all. For 
example, an x-contract between an auctioneer and a group of bidders should not allow 
one of the bidders to place his bids infinitely often and leave the rest of the bidders 
bid-starving. This correctness requirement is also known as fairness or absence of 
individual starvation. 
    CR10: Responsiveness: The request for a service will be answered before a finite 
amount of time. For example, an x-contract should guarantee that a buyer responds to 
every offer from a client in less than five days. 
    CR11: Absence of unsolicited responses: An x-contract should not allow a 
contractual party to send unsolicited responses. For example, an x-contract between a 
banker and a customer should not allow the banker to send unsolicited advertisement 
to the customer.  
   
3.1 Model-based validation of correctness requirements 
    Model-based validation is widely used for validating correctness requirements. This 
approach relies on the use of software tools that are known as model checkers. The 
core idea behind this approach is to use model-checking algorithms to determine, by 
means of reachability analysis, whether the contract model (a finite state transition 
system) satisfies a list of correctness requirements. The correctness requirements are 
specified as safety and liveness properties translated into temporal logics or regular 
 5
expressions. We discuss safety and liveness properties thoroughly in the Section 3.2. 
Model-based validation is a compromise between bare-eye inspection and 
mathematical proof and works well for distributed applications of moderate 
complexity. For this reason from here on we will focus our discussion on model-based 
validation and leave bare-eye inspection and mathematical proof aside.  
3.2 Safety and liveness properties   
    Informally we can define safety and liveness properties as follows: a property is a 
quality of a programme that holds true for every possible execution of the program.     
    Properties are expressed as statements. A safety property is a statement that claims 
that something will not happen. In other words, a safety property is a claim that a 
programme will never perform a given activity (for example, send messagej before 
messagei) presumably, because the activity is bad, that is, undesirable. Similarly, a 
liveness property is a statement that claims that something will eventually happen. In 
other words, a liveness property dictates that a programme will eventually perform a 
given activity (for example, send the sequence of messages messagei, messagej, 
messagek), presumably because the activity is good and desirable. 
    On the ground of our own experience with x-contract validation we argue that most, 
if not all, correctness requirements of traditional business contracts can be readily 
expressed either as safety or liveness properties. With the intention of giving the 
designer of an electronic contract some guidance about the kind of correctness 
requirement he/she is faced with, we will classify into safety and liveness properties 
the list of typical correctness requirements of electronic business contracts provided in 
Section 3:  
• Safety properties: reachability, partial correctness, invariant, deadlocks, 
precedence, absence of unsolicited responses. 
• Liveness properties: correct termination, occurrence, livelocks, 
responsiveness.  
    We are aware that it has been shown that not all correctness requirements can be 
readily classified as either safety or liveness property [10]. Contracting parties may 
desire complex correctness requirements that are a combination of a number of the 
above requirements. In practice, these situations are exceptional rather than normal. 
Fortunately, it has been formally proven that any correctness property can be 
represented as the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property [11], so our 
approach is practical.    
 
4 Representation of contracts by means of FSM  
 
    A contract can be represented as a set of FSMs, one for each of the contracting 
parties that interact with each other. The physical location of each FSM is irrelevant 
to the functionality of the x-contract and is decided at the time of implementation.  
    Conceptually, we can assume that a FSM is located within each contracting party 
and that these FSMs communicate with each other through communication channels. 
    Each entry in a contract is called a term or a clause.  The clauses of a contract 
stipulate how the signing parties are expected to behave. In other words, they list the 
rights and obligations of each signing party. The rights and obligations stipulated in a 
contract can be abstracted and grouped into a set of Rights (R) and a set of 
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Obligations (O). The sets R and O can be mapped into the events and the operations 
that the x-contract involves. 
    Fig. 1, shows the graphical representation of x-contracts we use in this paper, where 
e and o stand for event and operation, respectively (a null operation will be 
represented by ε). Thus e are business events, and o are business operations.  
    Any event can be triggered by a decision taken internally within the enterprise in 
which the event is to be performed (for example the purchaser exercising the right of 
deciding to send a purchase order), or by an operation performed externally within 
another enterprise (for example when the supplier wants to offer a new item to the 
purchaser). 
    The lines between the finite state machines in Fig. 1 indicate events being triggered 
by external operations. For example the event p was triggered at the purchaser’s side 
when the Supplier exercised the right of performing operation O1.  
The supplier’s FSM will allow the supplier to execute only the operations he has the 
right to execute and nothing else. Likewise, the FSM enforces the supplier to execute 
the operations he has the obligation to execute. The purchaser’s FSM works in a 
similar way. 
    For more details on representing contracts as FSMs, we refer the reader to [6].  
 
 
 
Supplier
supplier’s rights
purchaser’s rights
purchaser’s obligations
statem+1
em+1/om+1
Purchaser
states
statez ez/oz
ei/ε
supplier’s obligations
state1
stateq state2
statem
e 1/
o 1
e2/o2
e
m /o
m
…
statepstatem+2 …
em+2/om+2
ep/op
state1
e1/o1
 
Fig. 1. FSM notations. 
 
5 Validation of correctness requirements with Spin 
 
    Spin is a model checker that has gained a wide acceptance. Spin validates safety 
and liveness properties of models coded in the Pomela modelling language. The Spin 
toolkit is freely available, and includes a simulator and a validator.    
5.1 Spin verification tools 
    Spin comes with a graphical user interface called XSpin which can be used to edit 
Promela code, and to run the simulator and the validator.  
The Spin Simulator 
    The Simulator runs through a single sequence of reachable states (path or routes) of 
the model coded in Promela. The designer can choose a specific path for the simulator 
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to run through, or can leave the simulator to run through a random path. The simulator 
will test a specific path for some safety correctness requirements; freedom from 
deadlocks (CR4), unspecified receptions (which covers CR11), and unreachable states 
(CR3).  
The Spin Validator 
    The Validator is used for validating the correctness requirements of Promela code 
(the verification model). It generates and inspects all the states and paths of the 
system that are reachable from the initial state. The Spin validator lists a number of 
correctness properties that the designer can choose from to validate the correctness of 
its model. Spin’s correctness properties are very similar to the contractual correctness 
requirements that we listed in Section 3. Consequently we have found that Spin’s 
validator can be used to successfully validate contract correctness requirements. 
    To validate a contract model, we run the validator against each of the desired 
correctness requirements. The validator will highlight any paths through the model 
that have errors. The designer can then use the Simulator to run through the erroneous 
path, and trace the point at which the error originated.  
 
    In this section, we present an example of a contract (Fig. 2) for the supply of e-
goods between a Supplier and a Purchaser. The contract at a first glance looks correct. 
We will use Spin to verify whether the contract satisfies some of the correctness 
requirements listed in Section 3, and therefore discovering any inconsistencies within 
the contract.  
 
This deed of agreement is entered into as of the effective date identified below.
Between 
[Name] of [Address] (To be known as the (Supplier)), and [Name] of [Address] (To be knows as the 
(Purchaser)).
Whereas
(Supplier) desires to enter into an agreement to supply (Purchaser) with [Item].
Now it is hereby agreed that (Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall enter into an agreement subject to the following 
terms and conditions:
1. Definitions and Interpretations
1.1 Price, Dollars or $ is a reference to the currency of the [Country].
1.2 All information (purchase order, payment, notifications, etc.), is to be sent electronically. 
1.3 This agreement is governed by [Country] law and the parties hereby agree to submit to the jurisdiction of 
the Courts of the [Country] with respect to this agreement.
2. Offer
2.1 The supplier may use his discretion to send offers to the purchaser.
2.3 The purchaser is entitled to accept or reject the offer, but he shall notify his decision to the supplier.
3. Commencement and completion
3.1 The contract shall start immediately upon signature.
3.2 The purchaser and the supplier shall terminate the x-contract immediately after reaching a   deal for buying 
an item.
4. Disputes
4.1 (Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall attempt to settle all disputes, claims or controversies arising under or in 
connection with the agreement through consultation and negotiations in good faith and a spirit of mutual 
cooperation.
4.2(Supplier) and (Purchaser) shall provide electronic evidences about breaches of the e-contract.
4.3 This method of determination of any dispute is without prejudice to the right of any party to have the matter 
judicially determined by a [Country] Court of competent jurisdiction.
5 Amendment
5.1 This agreement may only be amended in writing signed by or on behalf of both parties.
E-SIGNATURES
In witness whereof (Supplier) and (Purchaser) have caused this agreement to be entered into by their duly 
authorized representatives as of the effective date written below.
Effective date of this agreement: [day] of [month] [year]
[E-signature]                         [E-signature]
[Person]                                [Person]
[Role]                                      [Role]
E-address for Notices:
[E-address]                           [E-address]  
 
Fig. 2. Example contract between a Purchaser and a  
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Supplier for the purchase of goods. 
 
    The contract clauses that we would like to verify are the following: 
 
 2. Offer 
2.1 The supplier may use his discretion to send offers to the purchaser. 
2.2 The purchaser is entitled to accept or reject the offer, but he shall notify his decision to the supplier. 
3     Commencement and completion 
3.1 The contract shall start immediately upon signature. 
3.2 The purchaser and the supplier shall terminate the x-contract immediately after reaching a deal for 
buying an item. 
  
    From these contract clauses, we can extract the sets of rights and obligations for the 
Purchaser and the Supplier and express them in terms of operations for FSMs. The 
sets of rights and obligations stipulated in this contract look as follows: 
 
Purchaser’s rights: 
PR1 : SendAccepted  -- right to accept offers. 
PR2 : SendRejected -- right to reject offers. 
Purchaser’s obligations: 
PO1 : StartEcontract -- obligation to start the x-contract. 
PO2 : SendAccepted or SendRejected -- obligation to reply to offers. 
PO3 : EndEcontract -- obligation to terminate the x-contract. 
Supplier’s rights: 
sR1 : SendOffer -- right to send offers. 
Supplier’s obligations: 
SO1 : StartEcontract -- obligation to start the x-contract. 
SO2 : EndEcontract -- obligation to terminate the x-contract. 
     
     Fig. 3 shows how the sets R and O are mapped into FSMs.   
 
E-contractSigned
StartEcontract
Purchaser Supplier
OfferRcvd
ε
OfferAccepted
SendAccepted,         EndEcontract
OfferEdited
SendOffer
OfferAcceptedRcvd
EndEcontract
OfferRejected
SendRejected
OfferRejectedRcvd
ε
Wating
for offer
Waiting
for results
EcontractSigned
StartEcontract
Editing
offer
Deal
Deciding
to buy
Deal
PO1
PO2
PO2
PO3
sR1
SO1
SO2
 
 
Fig. 3. Representation of an x-contract for the 
purchase of goods with FSMs. 
 
    To validate our contract clauses we have to convert the FSM shown into the 
modeling language Promela first. The result of this conversion is shown in Fig. 4. 
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/*Verification Model for the Contract Finite State Machines*/
/*in their initial ambiguous state*/
#define MA    20  /*Maximum acceptable offer*/
#define  OA    1   /*Offer accepted */
#define  OR    0   /*Offer rejected*/
mtype = {Offer, Response}
chan S2P = [1] of {mtype, int};
chan P2S = [1] of {mtype, byte};
proctype Supplier() /***Suppliers FSM***/
{
int offerValue; 
byte responseValue; /*OA or OR*/
SupEContractSigned:
EditingOffer: 
if
:: offerValue = 30; /* An offer that is too high > MA*/
:: offerValue = 20; /* < MA */
:: offerValue = 10; /* < MA */
fi;
if
:: S2P!Offer(offerValue) -> goto WaitingForResults;
:: skip /*Taking into account the possiblity that*/ 
fi;      /*the supplier might not send anything */
WaitingForResults: 
P2S ? Response(responseValue);
if
:: (responseValue == OR) -> goto EditingOffer;
:: (responseValue == OA) -> goto Deal;
fi;
Deal:
printf("\n\n Supplier: Deal \n\n");
end:
printf("\n\n Supplier: End \n\n");
}
proctype Purchaser() /***Purchasers FSM***/
{
int offerValue;
PurEContractSigned:
WaitingForOffer:
S2P ? Offer(offerValue) ->
DecidingToBuy:
if
::(offerValue>MA)-> P2S!Response(OR); 
goto WaitingForOffer;
:: else -> P2S ! Response (OA); goto Deal;
fi;
Deal:
printf("\n\n Purchaser: Deal\n\n");
end:
printf("\n\n Purchaser: End\n\n");
}
init
{
run Supplier(); 
run Purchaser(); 
}
 
 
Fig. 4. A model of a contract written in Promela. 
  
5.2 X-Contract verification 
5.2.1 Safety properties 
    Safety properties can be categorized into, general safety properties that must hold 
true for any x-contract (CR3: Reachability, CR4: Freedom from deadlocks, CR11: 
Absence of unsolicited responses), and specific safety properties that must hold true 
only if so required by the contracting parties for the specific requirements of a certain 
x-contract (CR5: Partial correctness, CR6: Invariant, and CR8: Precedence).  
    Running the Spin validator under its default settings will check for general safety 
properties. Validation of the remaining specific safety properties can be done by 
inserting “Assertions” within the Promela code. Running the Spin validator under its 
default settings gives us the results shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Output of the Spin validator. 
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    Spin has detected an error in our verification model. “invalid endstate (at depth 
11)”. The fourth line in Fig. 5 indicates that the Spin validator stops the verification 
process before completion because it detects an error in the model. XSpin saves the 
path where the error is detected. To trace the point at which the error occurred we can 
instruct XSpin to run the simulator through the offending path. The results of this 
simulation are shown in Fig. 6.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Simulation output of erroneous path. 
 
    After step 10, the Supplier was expected to send an offer to the Purchaser, but the 
Simulator does not show this occurring. A closer look at step 11 reveals that the trail 
ended after the simulator went through line 33 of the Promela verification model: 
 
31  if 
32  :: S2P!Offer(offerValue) -> goto WaitingForResults; 
33  :: skip /*Taking into account the possibility that*/   
34  fi;      /*the supplier might not send anything */ 
     
    Line 33 represents the fact that the Supplier might choose not to send the offer to 
the Purchaser for whatever reason. Fig. 5 also shows that the simulator detects 
problems in lines 60, and 37: 
 
59 WaitingForOffer: 
60 S2P ? Offer(offerValue) ->  
 
36 WaitingForResults:  
37 P2S ? Response(responseValue); 
 
No offerValue was received by the Purchaser process, and subsequently, no 
responseValue  was received by the Supplier process. The finite state machines of the 
Supplier and the Purchaser fall into a deadlock situation. 
A possible solution to avoid this undesirable situation is to make use of the 
Promela “timeout” statement. This statement allows a process to abort and not wait 
indefinitely for a condition that can no longer become true such as the one we just 
encountered:   
 
59  WaitingForOffer: 
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60  if 
61    ::S2P ? Offer(offerValue)  
62    ::timeout -> goto end  
63  fi; 
 
    We can run the validator as many times as necessarily, and after ensuring the 
correctness of the general safety requirement, we can use the validator to check for 
some specific safety correctness requirements. For example, we would like to check 
that the invariant “The price offered by the Supplier should not be accepted by the 
Purchaser if the price exceeds an agreed price P” holds (see CR6 in Section 3). To 
guarantee this invariant we can insert an assertion of the form assert(offerValue<=P) 
at the required check points in the verification model. We then set and run the 
validator to check for assertions. The validator does not signal any errors, so we know 
that the invariant we specified holds true.  
5.2.2 Liveness Properties 
    Unlike safety properties, there are no general liveness properties. All liveness 
properties are specific to the requirements of the contracting parties depending on the 
purposes of a specific contract. To validate liveness properties (correct termination, 
occurrence or accessibility, livelocks, responsiveness) we can insert specifically 
designed labels such as “accept” labels that check for livelocks, “progress” labels that 
check for progress states, and temporal claims, in the Promela code. 
    As an example, in our x-contract we would not desire a situation where the supplier 
infinitely often makes undesirable offers. That is we do not want livelock (CR9) in the 
x-contract. We can insert an accept label in line 20 as follows: 
 
17  EditingOffer:  
18  if 
19   :: offerValue = 30; 
20       acceptOfferTooHigh: skip  /* An offer that is too high > MA*/ 
21   :: offerValue = 20; /* < MA */ 
22   :: offerValue = 10; /* < MA */ 
23  fi; 
 
    We can now set the validator verification parameters to detect “livelock”. The 
output results show that the search stops after detecting an error. A simulator run 
would show that the problem occurs after the Supplier makes an offer with 
offerValue=30. The output shows that we have an undesirable situation where the 
Supplier can make unacceptable offers infinitely. There are many possible solutions to 
this problem, one would be for example to limit the Supplier to N<=10 offers.  
     Following testing the x-contract model against the desired correctness properties, 
and removal of detected ambiguities, the verification model and therefore the x-
contract must be modified accordingly.  For our example, the finite state machines are 
modified as can be seen in Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7. Revised contract FSMs. 
 
   After the corresponding modifications the contract clauses look as follows: 
 
2     Offer 
2.1  The supplier may use his discretion to send offers to the purchaser. 
2.2  If no offer is sent within seven days after the signature of the x-contract, or after 
       the latest rejected offer, the x-contract shall be terminated. 
2.3  The purchaser is entitled to accept or reject the offer, but he shall notify his  
       decision to the supplier within five days after the receipt of the offer. 
3     Commencement and completion 
3.1    The contract shall start immediately upon signature. 
3.2  The purchaser and the supplier shall terminate the x-contract immediately after  
       reaching a deal for buying an item. 
5.2.3 Complex correctness requirements 
    A very useful facility provided by Spin is the verification of “temporal claims”. 
Temporal claims can be used to express complex correctness requirements. This 
facility is very useful as transactions between parties to a contract may need to run in 
a certain sequence, and/or under certain conditions. 
 As a separate example let us consider the Promela code of Fig. 8 which describes a 
complaint handling state machine. We want the validator to check the requirement 
that a complaint about the quality of the goods must not be sent by the Purchaser 
before the goods are received from the Supplier. The verification model to express 
possible scenarios is shown in Fig. 8. 
    In XSpin, verification of temporal claims is done using the Linear Temporal Logic 
(LTL) Manager. We are claiming the following: It is invariantly true that following 
the placement of an order a complaint should not be received before the order is 
received. This is expressed in Linear Temporal Logic as follows: 
[] (placeOrder -> !complaintRecd U orderRecd). We can enter this formula into the LTL 
Manager (Fig. 8) and then run the validator. As expected, the validator detects that 
our claim is false. As it can be proved with the validator, it is enough to remove the 
lines in the Promela model that gives the Purchaser the option to complain before 
receiving the order, to make our claim hold true. 
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/*  Goods complaint example
* 
*/
bool placeOrder = false ;
bool complaintRecd = false ;
bool orderRecd = false ;
active proctype OrderPlacement()
{
// place an order
placeOrder = true ;
// Premature complaint randomly sent or not 
// sent to the Supplier
if
:: complaintRecd = true ; //complaint received by Supplier
:: skip ;
fi;
// receive order 
orderRecd = true ;
// a complaint was made
if
:: complaintRecd = true ;
:: skip ;
fi
}
 
 
 Fig. 8. Validation of a temporal claim for a Promela model, using the  
LTL property manager. 
6 Conclusions  
 
    In this paper, we have shown how by using finite state machines for converting 
conventional contracts into x-contracts, we can achieve the aim of eliminating the 
ambiguities that could hinder the correct implementation of x-contracts.  
    We have described how well known ideas from program validation can be applied 
to validate x-contracts.  
    No work has been published so far to show what the most common correctness 
requirements of electronic contracts are, and how they can be mapped into safety and 
liveness properties, and validated by means of a model checker.   
    We have illustrated our ideas with the help of simple examples. More complex 
examples for the verification of contracts are discussed in [12]; these examples have 
not been included in this paper to save space. 
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